Bangladesh’s Sovereign Choice, India's Strategic Concern: The Teesta Debate
Bangladesh says there is no cause for concern, but China’s role in the Teesta River project may deepen India’s strategic anxieties in its eastern neighbourhood.
People return home on boats, silhouetted against the setting sun along the banks of the Teesta River, in Jalpaiguri district of West Bengal, Friday, January 9, 2026 (IANS)
Published : June 30, 2026 at 8:49 PM IST
Updated : June 30, 2026 at 9:29 PM IST
New Delhi: The Bangladesh government’s latest assurance that there should be no concern over China’s involvement in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP) is unlikely to entirely allay anxieties in New Delhi.
While Dhaka insists that it will take into account the legitimate security interests of its neighbours and proceed responsibly on sensitive issues, the prospect of Chinese participation in a major infrastructure project on a river flowing through India's strategically sensitive eastern flank carries implications that extend well beyond water management and flood control.
Addressing a media briefing in Dhaka on Tuesday, Bangladesh Prime Minister’s Information and Broadcasting Adviser Zahed Ur Rahman said that Bangladesh, as an independent and sovereign state, will implement the project in accordance with the interests of its people and the country, leaving no scope for concern by any other country.
A group of fishermen sail in a boat in the waters of the Teesta Barrage at Gazoldoba in Jalpaiguri district of West Bengal on Wednesday, May 13, 2026. (IANS)
“We see no reason why any other country should have concerns over this development initiative,” Zahed was quoted as saying. “India or any other country will engage with Bangladesh as a sovereign state. Even if anyone has any security concerns, Bangladesh will take those into consideration. We will proceed on such sensitive issues without compromising.”
Zahed’s remarks come after Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s visit to China last week during which an agreement was reached under which experts from China and Bangladesh will conduct a technical feasibility study for the first time on the TRCMRP.
According to Zahed, China has extensive expertise and the necessary funding for this work. “Prime Minister Tarique Rahman has instructed that the work be started as quickly as possible with utmost importance,” he added.
On Monday, responding to reporters’ questions about India’s concerns about China’s role in the Teesta project, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said that his country’s cooperation with Bangladesh should be free from third-party influence.
“I would like to stress that China-Bangladesh cooperation does not target any third party and should be free from third-party influence,” Guo said. In January last year, the Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) and Chinese state-owned PowerChina signed an extension to a memorandum of understanding (MoU), pushing the TRCMRP.
According to media reports, under the deal, PowerChina will prepare a concept paper and conduct a feasibility study in 2026. After that, the Teesta project will be finalised.
The possibility of Chinese involvement in the TRCMRP goes far beyond a river engineering project. For India, especially given the location of the river and the evolving strategic environment in South Asia, the issue carries geopolitical, security, water-sharing and regional influence implications.
A fisherman uses a fishing gill net from a boat while looking for fish in the Teesta River at Gazaldoba in Jalpaiguri district of West Bengal on Saturday, April 25, 2026 (IANS)
The concerns in New Delhi are not necessarily about a Chinese-funded embankment or dredging project in themselves, but about the strategic footprint that could emerge if Chinese agencies become deeply embedded in a sensitive transboundary river system adjacent to India’s most vulnerable geography.
The Teesta originates in Sikkim, flows through West Bengal and enters Bangladesh before joining the Brahmaputra system. The Bangladeshi portion of the river lies close to India’s strategically sensitive Siliguri Corridor, often referred to as the “Chicken’s Neck”, a narrow strip barely 20-22 km wide at its narrowest point connecting mainland India with the eight northeastern states.
If Chinese state-owned enterprises, engineers, survey teams, communications systems and project management structures establish a long-term presence in the Teesta basin, Indian security planners may view it as another element of China’s expanding strategic footprint around India’s periphery.
India already faces Chinese military pressure along the Himalayan border and increasing Chinese influence in ports and infrastructure projects across South Asia. A Chinese role in the Teesta basin would place Chinese personnel and technologies close to one of India’s most vulnerable strategic chokepoints.
Large river management projects involve extensive hydrographic mapping, satellite imagery, terrain surveys, hydrological modelling and communications infrastructure. Indian security agencies may worry that such activities could indirectly provide China with valuable information regarding terrain and transport infrastructure in northern Bangladesh and adjoining Indian areas, bridges, roads and military logistics routes near the Siliguri Corridor, flood management infrastructure and water control mechanisms, and patterns of troop movement during emergencies.
Locals cross the Teesta River by boat as the river's water level gradually rises, in Jalpaiguri on Saturday, June 6, 2026. (IANS)
Unlike the Brahmaputra, where China is the upstream state, the Teesta has traditionally been an India-Bangladesh bilateral issue.
Chinese participation would effectively introduce a third major power into a dispute involving water allocation between India and Bangladesh. This could reduce India’s diplomatic leverage over future negotiations on Teesta water sharing and potentially internationalise what New Delhi considers a bilateral matter.
For decades India has maintained that transboundary river issues in South Asia should be handled directly between riparian states rather than involving external powers.
The Teesta water-sharing agreement between India and Bangladesh has remained unresolved since 2011 primarily because of objections from the government of then Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee regarding water availability for northern West Bengal.
Bangladesh has long viewed the delay as one of the most significant irritants in bilateral relations. Chinese willingness to finance and support the Teesta project could strengthen Dhaka’s negotiating position by giving Bangladesh an alternative partner for addressing Teesta-related economic and environmental problems.
The Teesta project should be viewed in the context of broader geopolitical developments rather than as an isolated issue. China has already become Bangladesh's largest trading partner and one of its biggest sources of military equipment and infrastructure financing. Recent agreements have expanded cooperation in ports, industrial zones, transport infrastructure and river management
If China becomes deeply involved in the Teesta project, it would add another strategic sector — water resources management — to this growing portfolio. The TRCMRP is expected to include components such as embankments, river training works, flood control structures, dredging, irrigation systems, transport infrastructure, and river ports and logistics facilities.
Such infrastructure is civilian in nature, but some assets could theoretically possess dual-use characteristics during crises or military contingencies. India has invested heavily in integrating its northeastern region through connectivity projects with Bangladesh, including rail links, inland waterways, port access, energy trade, and cross-border transport corridors.
If Bangladesh becomes more closely aligned with China in strategic infrastructure sectors, India may worry about the long-term security and resilience of these connectivity initiatives.
However, according to Uttam Kumar Sinha, Senior Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses and a leading commentator on transboundary water issues, India should not be complaining about the Bangladesh-China partnership on the Teesta project.
“The point is, we did not sign the Teesta treaty in 2011 when the draft was all ready,” Sinha told ETV Bharat. “But the Mamata government, you know, put waters to it. Since then, it is lying suspended. So, Bangladesh has found a convenient partner in China to develop its Teesta waters, in terms of water resource management, in terms of irrigation facilities, in terms of storage etc.”
He said that the agreement on the Teesta project is between Bangladesh and China, two sovereign states, and India should respect that. “But we should also be careful, alert, prepare for eventualities,” he said. “We should be prepared on our side, monitor the situation, what is happening.
We should also raise concerns when we talk with Bangladesh. We must also make sure that our security interests are taken into account and that no untoward events happen. So, I think that signaling is important from our side – firm signaling.”
Put together, if Chinese involvement remains limited to technical advice and financing, the implications for India may be manageable. However, if the project evolves into a long-term Chinese presence involving infrastructure construction, communications systems and sustained institutional involvement in the Teesta basin, India could view it as another significant expansion of Chinese influence into a strategically sensitive region adjoining the Siliguri Corridor and India’s northeastern gateway.
Last Updated : June 30, 2026 at 9:29 PM IST
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